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ABSTRACT
Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a traffic application of wireless sensor network, which is
also a new mobile ad hoc networks composed of vehicle nodes, roadside units, service
providers and other components. In VANET, data is transmitted by the wireless channel, which
is subject to potential threat like information leak and data attack due to the openness and
sensitivity of the auto organization network itself. How to ensure the identity privacy and
trusted communication in VANETs is the key issue to be solved urgently. The existing work
usually uses authentication mechanism, but the user’s privacy disclosure is inevitable during
the authentication process. Some anonymous authentication schemes have been proposed to
solve the problem of privacy disclosure regardless of considering anonymity abuse. However,
anonymity abuse is also severe in VANET. In view of the above problems, this paper proposes a
scheme based on fair blind signature and secret sharing algorithm. By security analysis and
experiment, the scheme has been proved to be higher anonymity and higher efficiency.
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1. Introduction
VANET (vehicular ad hoc network) is a kind of mobile
ad hoc network, which has many features such as multi-
hop, self-organization and rapid change of network
topology. It establishes a temporary multi-hop autono-
mous network through the wireless communication
between vehicles and road infrastructures, which can
ensure the information exchange such as the speeds and
the locations. Generally, VANET is composed of several
parts: (1). OBU (on board unit). (2). RSU (roadside
unit). (3). AC (authentication centre) and (4). SP (service
provider). VANET communication mainly includes
vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to infrastructure. Because
of the self-organization of the vehicular network, the
vehicle node should be used as not only the wireless
communication node to transmit its own messages, but
also a wireless router node to relay messages to the other
nodes in order to achieve the long-distance messages
transmission. At the same time, a vehicle is also a sense
node to perceive common traffic information and vehi-
cle information such as position, speed, direction and
driving condition and so on. RSU is the roadside base
station that provides indirect communication among
vehicles and between vehicles and administration depart-
ment. It can also provide Internet access service for
vehicles. As an information service provider of Internet,
SP can provide many Internet services for vehicles [1,2].
When the network is deployed in large-scale,
because of the rapid change of network topology, the
delay of communication and the lack of trust mecha-
nism, there exists a series of problems, such as message
authentication delay, channel instability and band-
width shortage. Therefore, the design of highly efficient
and reliable authentication scheme is the research hot-
spot of the VANET [3,4]. At the same time, the infor-
mation of the user’s identity and location is important
and sensitive in the process of communication, so it
has to ensure anonymity as well as reliability. In recent
years, a lot of researchers had put forward some kinds
of anonymous authentication schemes. However, there
are some weaknesses in these studies. Some studies do
not consider the single fault, some studies only provide
the anonymity between different vehicles but not
between vehicles and RSUs, some ignore the necessity
of tracking after the anonymity is abused by malicious
users. These weaknesses make proposed schemes
unsuitable for the requirements of VANET.
In view of the above problems, this paper presents a
self-organized anonymous authentication and tracking
scheme based on the fair blind signature and secret
sharing algorithm, focusing on identity information
protection and communication anonymity.
2. Related work
In recent years, a variety of authentication schemes are
proposed in the literatures. Ma et al. [5] combine smart
card and password authentication technology to design
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a secure authentication scheme, which can resist the
offline password guessing and denial of service attacks
and provides forward secrecy and ensures user ano-
nymity. Wang et al. [6] consider the trade-off between
security and privacy and put forward an anonymous
two-factor authentication scheme based on the basic
evaluation index. Based on Kim-Kim two-factor
authentication technology, a method [7] is proposed to
enhance the program efficiency without additional
communication and computational overhead while
increasing security ability.
In VANET, the privacy information like user iden-
tity and location is important and sensitive in the com-
munication process. System should ensure not only
the authentic identity but also prevent privacy from
leaking [2]. The previous schemes protecting VANET
privacy focus on the identity of the anonymous
authentication. Common techniques used in studies
include group signature scheme [8–10], ring signature
scheme [11], ID-based signature scheme [12–16],
blind signature [17] or mess-up technology and
so on [18–21].
Sun et al. [8] and Guo et al. [9] earlier used Boneh
group signature technology for in-vehicle communica-
tions. Calandriello et al. [10] point out that the compu-
tational overhead and length of the group signature in
the signature generation and verification process are
much larger than the general public key infrastructure
(PKI) digital signature schemes (such as ECDSA), so
schemes using the kind of signature for in-vehicle
safety are inefficient. Following researchers wanted to
improve the high overhead and security risks of the
group signature. Among them, some researchers
resorted to use ring signature scheme to achieve the
desired objectives. Ring signature is similar to a simpli-
fied group signature scheme and it uses rules to form a
ring, which has anonymity feature. For example,
Zhang et al. [11] propose a privacy-preserving authen-
tication protocol based on ring signature without bilin-
ear pairings in VANETs. It achieves effective privacy
protection and authentication mechanisms and also
reduces the computational overhead of signature gen-
eration process because of discarding the complex
operation of bilinear pairings. There are some
researchers who focus on using the identity-based sig-
nature (IBS) to implement identity-based anonymous
authentication such as Sun et al. [12], Li et al. [13],
Jinila and Komathy [14], Zhu et al. [15] and He et al.
[16]. Among these international researchers, Sun et al.
[12] are relatively early researchers who paid attention
to this problem. They used zero-knowledge proof and
threshold secret sharing algorithm to design an anony-
mous identity authentication scheme based on signa-
tures. PPAS [15] uses IBS based on bilinear pairings to
solve anonymous authentication issues not only
between OBUs but also between the RSUs and OBUs.
In addition, in order to achieve conditional privacy
and authentication purposes. He et al. [16] design a
similar identity-based signature. But because it is based
on elliptic curve algorithm without bilinear pairings
operation, it has less computational overhead and
more safe. Proxy Blind Signature Scheme (PBSS) [17]
proposes a signature scheme based on blind signature
and proxy multi-signature certification technology,
which solves authentication problems between the
nodes. The use of two signature technologies realizes
the on-board authentication interactivity and
improved communication safety. Experimental results
show that PBSS can better meet the on-board node
mobility and complexity and the authentication effi-
ciency has good performance.
Other VANET anonymous authentication schemes
use different kinds of obfuscation techniques, such as
pseudonym and mix technology and so on. VSPN [18]
uses bilinear mappings and proxy re-encryption mech-
anism to design a pseudonym authentication for auto-
motive networks. Van den Berg et al. [19] propose a
vehicle-based certificate-selection method for enhanc-
ing the privacy in VANETs, in which vehicles share
numbers of certificates. Each vehicle is able to detect
and identify the certificates used by neighbours and
then it can choose a used certificate for its own safety
communication. This method makes the certificate not
unique to achieve anonymous authentication enhanc-
ing privacy. In addition, k-anonymity is also used in
this field. K-anonymity means unless there are k-1
data that are released at the same time the k-user can
be disclosed. Chen et al. [20] propose a query-aware
location privacy scheme based on p-sensitive and k-
anonymity for road networks, which puts all the k
users as an anonymous entity in a certain area and
authority uses the optimized queries to determine a
specific entity. The study of Cabellero-Gil et al. [21] is
also based on k anonymous algorithm, but it takes into
account the tracking after the anonymous abuse. Theo-
retical and experimental analysis shows that it can
improve the effectiveness of the tracking. LESPP [22]
uses lightweight symmetric encryption and message
authentication code (MAC) to generate signature and
can quickly verify regenerated MAC signature with a
low memory overhead, but fails to consider the prob-
lem of single point failure. 2FLIP [23] is based on dis-
persed trusted authority using several lightweight
terminals’ hash signature and MAC to rapidly sign and
authenticate nodes. It has a strong repudiation, and
also can conditionally track the real information of
vehicle. But the whole tracking process is under the
control of a certain trusted authority, also without con-
sidering the single point failure.
Above studies are based on a coarse-grained classifica-
tion. In reality, researcher needs to integrate multiple tech-
nologies to complete a scheme. For example, based on
hash chain, bilinear pairings, IBS and pseudonym PASS
[24] optimizes certificate revocation list in pseudonym
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authentication and certificate renewal process, which sig-
nificantly reduces the system overhead of the scheme.
As we mentioned above, there are also many weak-
nesses existing in current studies, such as single point
failure, anonymity abuse and so on. So we propose a
novel mechanism to improve them.
3. System model and research objectives
3.1. Basic network structure
The network model used in this project mainly
includes three types of entities as illustrated in Figure 1.
(1) Vehicle entity, called V . Set its true identity as
IDV , pseudonym as IDPV . Each of vehicle enti-
ties includes the on-board unit and common
communication unit, such as sensor input unit,
wireless communication unit, processor and
hardware security unit. OBU stores the informa-
tion of the vehicle, such as ID, license plate num-
ber, related vehicle properties and other
information, which is not easy to be changed.
(2) RSU, which consists of radio frequency controller,
network communication module, power module
and microwave transceiver module, is responsible
for the signal and data transmission, encoding and
decoding, decryption and so on. Compared to the
OBU node, with higher storage and forwarding
capabilities, it is responsible for communication
with not only vehicle units but also Internet.
(3) Trusted centre. It mainly contains AC, PAC
(pseudonym authentication centre) and TC
(tracking centre).
3.2. Research objectives
The main features of the program have:
(1) The separation of anonymous authentication
and tracking of vehicles. Vehicle’s pseudonym
for the certification application is jointly pro-
duced by the certification centre and the vehicle,
which can detect any fraud and forgery attack.
(2) Distributed pseudonym tracking. Not a single
TC is in charge of all the tracking information
that avoids the single point failure and improves
the robustness of the scheme. At the same time,
the possibility of collusion is very low if the num-
ber of compromised tracking centres is less than
a certain threshold.
(3) TC does not need to store pseudonym certificate
and the relation of pseudonym and ID, which
reduces storage and search overhead of the TC.
(4) Privacy protection. For an honest and law-abid-
ing vehicle node in the VANET, its identity pri-
vacy will be protected as well as the identity of
the illegal vehicle is to be tracked if anonymity
abuse happens.
4. Anonymous authentication scheme based
on fair blind signature and secret sharing
4.1. Basic process of scheme
(1) Vehicle V is registered at AC, and it is verified
and signed by AC.
(2) The vehicle V applies for pseudonymous certifi-
cate from PAC, and it is verified by PAC before
pseudonym is issued.
(3) V safely communicates with other vehicles and
RSUs via pseudonym certificate.
(4) TC uses secret sharing algorithm in a tracking
group to keep the private key from the process of
verification and pseudonym creation. If anonym-
ity abuse and other violations of the law happen,
other vehicles are able to request PAC, TC to
track the pseudonym of the relevant malicious
vehicle.
(5) TC convenes members of the tracking group to
restore the true identity of the malicious vehicle,
and revoke pseudonym and punish this vehicle.
4.2. The detailed algorithm
This scheme is based on the idea of fair blind signature
and secret sharing algorithm, taking into account both
aspects of privacy protection and the tracking of anon-
ymous abuse. IDV is the pivotal information for vehi-
cle V , which is kept as a secret. In mutual
communication, vehicle V uses the signed pseudonym
rather than true identity to anonymously interact with
other vehicles and RSU node. This requires a unique
signature for each vehicle node, and the signature
must be derived from the trusted third party. In this
signature algorithm, the PAC works as the trusted
third party to issue a reliable pseudonym certificate
that does not disclose IDV of V . At the same time, if
an anonymous abuse happens in the vehicle communi-
cation process, the victim can put forward a tracking
appeal, and then the tracking group will convene the
Figure 1. Basic network structure model.
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relevant members to restore the identity information of
the malicious vehicle.
4.2.1. Pseudonym issue based on a fair blind
signature
Pseudonym issue mainly includes the following phases
Phase 1 Initialization
The vehicle nodes, AC, PAC, TC, respectively, gen-
erate the corresponding public key and private key. V
generates IDV ’s public key ðNV ; eVÞ and private key
dV , which can be used for a long time. AC generates
public key ðNAC; eACÞ and private key dAC. PAC
generates public key ðNPAC; ePACÞ and private key d
PAC that will be frequently updated. TC generates
public key ðNTC; eTCÞ and private key dTC. AC, PAC
and TC open public key and the vehicle is loaded with
the pre-installed public keys of AC, PAC and TC.
Phase 2 Vehicle registration phase
The main steps of this phase are as follows:
(1) V registers at AC.
V secretly sends IDVknkSVkCertV to AC. SV is the
signature that V signs for the above data, which is
denoted as ðIDVknÞdVmod=NV , where n is the num-
ber of applications for pseudonyms and IDV contains
the information of vehicle identity.
(2) AC verifies and issues pseudonym.
AC checks the signature ðIDVknÞdVmod=NV . If
successful, AC agrees to issue a pseudonym and return
IDACkIDVktskSAC to V , where ts is a time stamp
of validity period and SAC is the signature
½ðIDACkIDVktsÞdACmodNACeVmod NV , which AC
signs for the above data.
(3) V verifies AC’s signature.
V extracts and decrypts ½ðIDACkIDVktsÞdACmod NACeV
mod NV and gets ðIDACkIDVktsÞdACmodNAC. Then, V
verifies AC’s signature. If successful, it selects random
numbers Ai, Bi( 1  i  n) and transmits the blind value
BieACAi to AC.
(4) AC calculates Ci ¼ ðBieACAi  ðikIDVktsÞÞdAC,
Di ¼ ððikIDVktsÞeTCÞdAC and returns the result
to V .
(5) V verifies DieAC ¼ ðikIDVktsÞeTC. If successful,
it gets rid of blind factor and gets Ei; 1 ¼ Ci=Bi
and Ei; 2 ¼ ðEi; 1eTCÞ=Di. Assuming the pseudo-
nym ID is IDPVi ¼ Ai  ðikIDVktsÞkAieTC. V
sends ðIDACkIDPVikEi; 1kEi; 2kePVikNPVikSPViÞePAC to
PAC, 1  i  n, where SPVi is the signature that
V signs to get temporary private key dPVi.
(6) PAC verifies the signature and issues certificate.
PAC checks the signature of the V . If successful, it
extracts IDPVi and gets Ai  ðikIDVktsÞ, AieTC, Ei; 1 and
Ei; 2. Then, it verifies whether Ei; 1eAC ¼ ðCi=BiÞeAC ¼
ðAi  ðikIDVktsÞdACÞeAC ¼ Ai  ðikIDVktsÞ and
Ei; 2eAC ¼ ðEi; 1eTC=DiÞeAC ¼ ðAiðikIDVktsÞÞeTCðikIDVktsÞeTC ¼ AieTC. If suc-
cessful, PAC sends Certpvi ¼ IDPACkIDPViktskePVikN
PVikSPAC to V .
4.2.2. Anonymous communication
After the completion of the pseudonym issue, the vehi-
cle will use pseudonym during anonymous communi-
cation. Assume the vehicle as V . V selects Certpvi
(1  i  n) from n pseudonym certificates and com-
bines temporary private signing key dPVi with the
message to be sent to form anonymous message set
Mj (1  i  m, m is the number of messages in this
message set), and then V broadcasts the message set to
nearby area. After receiving the message set, nearby
vehicle will use the public key information of the ini-
tialization phase to verify the validity of signature. If
successful, nearby vehicle will accept it or opt to con-
tinue broadcasting to next neighbours. If unsuccessful,
nearby vehicle will discard it as an invalid message set.
4.2.3. Threshold sharing
After the completion of the signing, TC is in charge
of saving the private key dTC. In order to avoid sin-
gle point of failure, the secret sharing scheme is uti-
lized. In the scheme, the dTC is not stored in the TC
for a long time, but kept in a tracking group. System
allocates the private key dTC to m tracking members
and at least nðn  mÞ members are needed to work
together to recover the private key information. Secret
sharing process of dTC is as follows:
(1) After the completion of the signing, TC deter-
mines m peers as the tracking members from the
decentralized TC group. Assume these members
are T1;T2;T3:::::Tm, the threshold value is
nðn  mÞ, namely at least n tracking members
are needed to restore information.
(2) Assume finite field GEðf Þ, in which f is a
prime number and f >m. TC distributes the
private key tom tracking members. To ensure these
tracking members share the private key and at least
n tracking members are needed to restore informa-
tion, system selects n 1 independent factors in
the finite field a1; a2; ai:::; an 1 ð0  ai  f Þ.




j ¼ a0þ a1x þ    þ an 1xn1,
where a0 is the key dTC to be shared.
(3) TC randomly selects different values i, every i
meets ð1  i  mÞ. Calculate ðdTCÞi ¼ f ðiÞ
modf , then distribute the shared ðdTCÞi and the
corresponding i to the tracking group. After
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completion of the distribution of the private key,
TC clears the private key information.
4.2.4. Distributed tracking illegal vehicle
When the anonymous illegal behaviour happens, other
vehicles can put forward the request to the tracking
group to find the malicious vehicle. According to the
known pseudonym certificate, the group members can
join to recover the pseudonym to the real information of
illegal vehicle, so that the tracking function takes effect.
The main processes are as follows:
(1) When receiving an illegal message submitted by
a victim vehicle, PAC first gets pseudonym cer-
tificate CertPV from the message and checks
whether the message time stamp is effective. If
the verification is successful, PAC will collect
data-set and send the pseudonym tracking
request q to the tracking group.
(2) TC and PAC verify whether the signature CertP
V is valid. If successful, they extract IDPV from
CertPV . Then, TC gathers tracking group mem-
bers together, and distributes the message IDPVk
q among members. Because the recovery of the
private key will need at least n members, TC ran-
domly selects n members from the tracking
group who share the private key. These n mem-
bers can provide their shared fragment
ðxi; yiÞ ¼ ði; dTCiÞ. Using the Lagrange interpo-







xi xj. From the above








5.1. The anonymity of the scheme
In the process of communication, AC, PAC and other
ordinary vehicles in VANET cannot discover the cor-
responding relationship between the pseudonym of a
vehicle and its real identity. After the private key infor-
mation is distributed to the tracking group, the TC in
the signing process will be no longer involved in any
subsequent communication. Other vehicles can verify
a certain blind signature, but cannot know the true
identity of corresponding vehicle, which ensure a good
protection for privacy.
(1) For AC, because the parameters Ai, Bi are ran-
domly generated and only stored in the vehicle
V , even if AC obtains IDV , BieACAi, Ci, Di,
and ts information, it is impossible to
deduce parameter Ai so it does not calcu-
lateIDPVi ¼ Ai  ðikIDVktsÞkAieTC. Therefore,
AC cannot get the corresponding relationship
between identity and pseudonym.
(2) For PAC, because the dTC is the unique infor-
mation of the TC, even if PAC has obtained
IDPVi, Ei; 1, Ei; 2, ts, NPVi, ePVi or other rele-
vant information, without the private key of TC
it is impossible to obtain the value of the parame-
ter Ai from AieTC by Ei; 1, Ei; 2 and IDPVi.
Therefore, PAC is unable to relate the pseudo-
nym with true identity of vehicles.
(3) For other vehicles in the VANET, even if they have
gained IDPVi, ts, ePVi and NPVi information,
without the private key dTC of TC, they cannot
extract any relevant information from a certain
pseudonym because the difficulty of decryption of
AieTC is equivalent to the attack to algorithm RSA,
which is infeasible in the computation.
5.2. Traceability of the scheme
Only with the help of more than n tracking members,
the scheme can restore the true identity via the pseudo-
nym, which ensures anonymity as well as tracking
function. Vehicle node registers in AC, then PAC and
TC combine to deal with pseudonym, so the true iden-
tity of the vehicle has some link with the system, which
exists in the subsequent communication. By distribut-
ing the private key information to different tracking
members, the scheme can avoid the single track centre
failure but is easy to track the illegal vehicles.
5.3. The authentication security of the scheme
The scheme can satisfy the security of authentication
process. In the process of pseudonym application,
every message will carry the corresponding signature,
which means the messages without signature will not
be accepted. This can ensure the effectiveness of
authentication and prevent common attack. The diffi-
culty that vehicles, PAC or other attackers want to
forge signatures or pseudonyms to implement fraud
are equivalent to the factorization of large numbers.
(1) Anti-forgery attack
In the process of V application for pseudonym from
PAC, if another vehicle V 0 wants to forge V 0s pseudo-
nym, it needs to forge the parameters Ei; 1 and Ei; 2, in
which Ei; 1 meets Ei; 1eAC ¼ Ai ¢ðikIDV 0 ktsÞ, Ei; 2
meets Ei; 2eAC ¼ AieTC. Because the dAC is a secret of
AC, V
0
cannot get it, and the calculation of Ei; 1 and
Ei; 2 is infeasible, so V
0
cannot pass the verification of
PAC. At the same time, because of the existence of
time stamp ts, it is more difficult to forge a pseudonym.
(2) Tamper resistance attack
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In the process of certification, the information that
V sends to AC cannot be tampered by AC. The reason
is as follows. If the false identity information is added
to the blind signature, the blind signature in authenti-
cation phase cannot be passed when V calculates
whether DieAC ¼ ðikIDVktsÞeTC. On the other hand,
the information that V sent to PAC has been attached
with the signature of PAC and verified by AC, so V
itself cannot change the signature information. The
difficulty to tamper a signature is also equivalent to the
difficulty of the decomposition of large factor.
(3) Effectiveness of authentication
In the process of pseudonym application, V is verified
and signed by AC, and use attained signature to obtain
pseudonym certificate from PAC. The whole process
needs mutual authentication. In the process of communi-
cation, the vehicle is accepted by the other vehicles using
this pseudonym certificate. If an external attacker wants
to cheat others, it has to simultaneously forge the signa-
ture of V and AC, which is infeasible in computation.
5.4. The robustness of the scheme
(1) The registration at AC, the pseudonym issue at
PAC and tracking with the assistance of TC are
separated, so AC and PAC are not able to have
tracking capability. Even if AC, PAC are com-
promised, the vehicle’s true identity will not be
disclosed.
(2) In secret sharing phase of the scheme, the private
key dTC is split and distributed to m tracking
members. If an attacker gets less than n shares of
the private key, it cannot restore the polynomial
f ðxÞ. Also for conspiracy attack, less than n TCs
cannot conspire to calculate the private key dTC.
In the legal recovery process, the private key d
TC can also be recovered even if loss of some
shares occurs. In practical application, we can
reasonably set the values of parameters m and n
to improve the security, so the scheme can have
strong robustness.
6. Experiment and result analysis
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, simu-
lation experiment is carried out. Experiment uses C++
language and is based on visual studio 2012 platform of
Windows7 system with 2.6 GHZ i5 processor and 4G
memory. The experimental data-set is generated using
Thomas Brinkhoff road network [25] widely recognized
by the mobile data management industry. Oldenburg
traffic network (5 km5 km) is taken as the input to gen-
erate mobile data-set and communication node objects
as illustrated in Figure 2.
According to the definition of data packet format of
security standard IEEE 1609.2 [26] for VANET, the
definition of pseudonym message format is as follows.
MID is the message identifier, which defines the
message type in a pseudonym period. MData is the
information carried by the effective data including
the relevant information of the vehicle, such as
vehicle speed, location, direction, etc. TS is the time
stamp which records the time of message creation
to prevent invalid packet and message replay attack.
Sign is the signature for the above three data items.
CertPV is the pseudonym certificate, TTL is the sur-
vival time which defines the termination of messages
transmission to prevent the infinite spread of
message.
Consider a communication cycle using a pseudo-
nym certificate. If all messages in the transmission
have a pseudonym certificate, communication over-
head is too large. However, if only the front single mes-
sage includes pseudonym certificate instead of the
behind message, if communication channel problem
occurs, for example, the receiver does not successfully
receive a certain message, the other messages in this
communication cycle are unable to be verified. Assume
y is the number of the whole messages in pseudony-
mous communication period, Z is the number of mes-
sages carrying pseudonym. The experiment uses
message receiving ratio model of communication
channel provided by paper [10], namely
PrecvðdÞ ¼ 0:04d þ 1=7 sinðp=125 dÞþ1, where
Precv is message receiving rate and d is the message
transmission distance. Message authentication success
rate is defined as Pauth ¼ 1 ð1 PrecvÞz . Figure 3
Figure 2. The communication node.
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illustrates the impact of the message transmission dis-
tance to the message-receiving rate. When the distance
increases, the message-receiving rate is reduced.
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between message
transmission distance d, the number of messages of a
pseudonym carrying Z and the success authentication
rate Pauth. With the decreasing of the d, the success
receiving rate increases. When d is fixed, with the
increasing of the number of pseudonym carrying mes-
sages, the success authentication rate increases accord-
ingly. From this picture, we can learn message success
authentication rate is more than 90% when Precv95
% (d  150m), z4, so we select the number of mes-
sages of a pseudonym z = 4, which is able to meet the
authentication requirement for most of the conditions.
6.1. Performance analysis
Table 2 compares some algorithms, PBSS [17], LESPP
[22] and 2FLIP [23] in anonymity, authentication and
traceability fields. PBSS [17] adopts the distributed
proxy blind signature, which can avoid forgery attacks
and meet authentication security, but never considers
tracking of the abuse of anonymous. The whole track-
ing process of LESPP [22] and 2FLIP [23] is highly
dependent on a certain trusted authority, without con-
sidering the single point failure and tracking abuse of
the trusted authority.
6.2. Communication and storage overhead
The scheme PBSS [17] needs three phases: the signa-
ture authorization, proxy signature and signature veri-
fication. Each message in the process of signature
needs to carry a pseudonym certificate. Compared
with PBSS, the number of the interaction in the pseu-
donym issue phase is reduced to two rounds. At the
same time, it is unnecessary that all the information
carry pseudonym certificate in the signature process.
In this experiment, we set the number of messages in a
communication cycle as 400. Define the average length
of the message by len ¼ ðz 941þ ðy  zÞÞ=y. When
z ¼ 4, guaranteeing the success rate Pauth90%, the
relationship between the average message size and the
total number of messages in a cycle is as follows.
From Figure 5 we can see that when the total num-
ber of periodical messages increases, the average length
of the message decreases. In the case of plenty of pseu-
donym messages, both schemes can reduce the over-
head. However, our scheme is better than PBSS.
7. Conclusion
Aiming to protect privacy in VANET, this paper pro-
poses a secure scheme based on fair blind signature
and threshold secret sharing. This scheme has good
effect of anonymity, low storage overhead and high
efficiency, and can also track the anonymous abuse
cases, which can effectively prevent the illegal vehicle
from attacking. It can meet the double requirements of



































































Figure 4. The effect of different Precv and z.
Table 2. The comparison of different schemes.
Table column head
Attributes PBSS LESPP 2FLIP FBSS
Integrity @ @ @ @
Authentication @ @ @ @
Anonymity @ @ @ @
Strong privacy protection ‘ @ @ @
Conditional tracking ‘ @ @ @
Distributed tracking ‘ ‘ ‘ @



























Figure 5. The average of message.
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anonymous authentication and tracking abuse of ano-
nymity in VANET.
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